2. Risks to the financial sector and its resilience by Banco de España
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 51 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, AUTUMN 2019  2 RISKS TO THE FINANCIAL SECTOR AND ITS RESILIENCE
2
RISKS TO THE FINANCIAL SECTOR AND ITS RESILIENCE
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 52 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, AUTUMN 2019  2 RISKS TO THE FINANCIAL SECTOR AND ITS RESILIENCE
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 53 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, AUTUMN 2019  2 RISKS TO THE FINANCIAL SECTOR AND ITS RESILIENCE
This chapter reviews the situation and risks of the Spanish financial system, paying 
special attention to the banking sector. Furthermore, it presents the results of the stress 
tests conducted for this sector and also its direct interconnections with non-residents 
and indirect interconnections with the rest of the financial sector. Since the last FSR the 
Spanish banking sector has continued the process of deleveraging against a background 
of low profitability and slightly improving solvency. The quality of the balance sheet has 
also improved due to decreasing NPLs and foreclosed assets. The stress tests on 
the banking sector show adequate resilience at aggregate level, underpinned by the 
aforementioned improvement in balance sheet quality. Under the adverse scenario, 
the stress test analysis incorporates also a limited ability to generate operating income 
by banks and lower credit growth than under the baseline scenario. The results are 
sensitive to the value adjustment assumptions applied to sovereign exposures.
2.1 Deposit institutions
2.1.1 Balance sheet structure, risks and vulnerabilities
Credit risk
Total	lending	by	deposit	institutions	in	Spain	decreased	by	1.2%	year-on-year	
in	June	2019.	This was a significant moderation in the rate of fall, since in the same 
month a year earlier the decrease was 2.8%. As a result, total loans stood at €1,159 
billion (see Chart 2.1). The decrease in lending was apparent in all the larger lending 
banks and affected loans to non-financial corporations most (see Chart 2.2). 
However, the fact that the median of the distribution, which does not take into 
account size differences between banks, is positive and rising in the non-financial 
corporations segment, suggests that lending by smaller banks is expanding.
Year-on-year	growth	of	new	loans	to	households	and	non-financial	corporations	
moderated. Lending between June 2018 and June 2019 amounted to €459 billion, 
of which more than 70% were new loans (see Chart 2.1). In recent months new loans 
have held steady, so the year-on-year growth rate of new loans decreased to 4.6% 
and the increase in loan principal drawn down declined to 12.6%.
Financing	 extended	 by	 the	 banking	 sector	 to	 non-financial	 corporations	
through	 the	purchase	of	 their	debt	 issues	 increased	by	€1.9	billion	 in	2019.	 
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Total credit continued falling to stand at €1,159 billion in June 2019, although a slight pick-up in the past quarter had the effect of moderating 
its year-on-year rate of fall. New lending held steady in the past twelve months, which meant that its year-on-year change also moderated.
CREDIT TO THE RESIDENT PRIVATE SECTOR
Business in Spain, ID
Chart 2.1
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Before December 2016 information was not available on the increase in the principal drawn down in existing loans. Consequently, the first data 
item for this series, accumulated over twelve months, is represented in November 2017. The rate of change shown only refers to new loans.
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Credit to the resident private sector fell across the board in all the larger lending banks, although the median change at banks remained 
positive, both in total credit and, more particularly, in credit to non-financial corporations.
DISTRIBUTION BY INSTITUTION OF THE CHANGE IN CREDIT TO THE RESIDENT PRIVATE SECTOR
Business in Spain, ID
Chart 2.2
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The graph shows the density function (or frequency distribution) of the year-on-year change of credit for Spanish deposit institutions, weighted 
by the credit corresponding to each institution. This density function is approximated through a kernel estimator which allows a non-parametric 
estimate of the density function, yielding a continuous and smoothed graphical representation of that function.
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As shown in Chapter 1 (see Chart 1.10), the balance of outstanding debt issued by 
Spanish non-financial corporations has expanded significantly between 2016 and 
2019. Indeed, in June 2019 these securities represented 13.2% of total financing to 
non-financial corporations (see Chart 2.3). Deposit institutions can also finance 
these firms indirectly by acquiring those securities. Specifically, their holdings in 
June 2019 stood at €11 billion, up €3 billion compared to 2017. Hence, the weight of 
banks’ holdings in total issues held steady at slightly below 10%.
The	behaviour	of	 lending	was	underpinned	by	 the	stabilisation	of	 financing	
conditions. The interest rates on new loans have remained at much the same level 
over the past 12 months for both households and non-financial corporations. At mid-
2019, the approval rate of loans requested by non-financial corporations from banks 
with which they were not currently dealing stood at 31% of the total number of 
applications received, practically the same rate as a year earlier.
Forborne	 loans	 continued	 to	 decrease	 over	 the	 past	 year to stand at 5.4% 
of total credit to the resident private sector in June 2019. The year-on-year rate of 
change of these loans was –20.2%, a decline which was 2.7 pp smaller than a year 
earlier. This decrease was across the board in non-financial corporations (–21.3%) 
and households (–18.9%).
Although the main source of financing of non-financial corporations is bank loans, the weight of debt securities has increased by more than 
4 pp since March 2016 to stand at 13.2% in June 2019. The weight of debt securities issued by non-financial corporations that are held by 
deposit institutions decreased significantly at the beginning of the Eurosystem corporate bond purchase programme in June 2016, 
subsequently steadying at nearly 10% of the total debt issuance of these firms.
PARTICIPATION OF THE BANKING SECTOR IN THE FINANCING OF NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS
Bussines in Spain, ID
Chart 2.3
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Transferred loans include those removed from the balance sheet, those transferred to securitisation funds and other transfers.
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The	NPL	ratio	of	the	resident	private	sector	in	business	in	Spain	continued	to	
decrease	to	stand	at	5.3%	in	June	2019.	As a result, the cumulative decrease 
from the high in December 2013 is 8.7 pp (see Chart 2.4). In year-on-year terms, 
NPLs decreased by 17.6%, a smaller drop than in 2018, with a portion of the decline 
this year being due to wholesale disposals of NPL portfolios by some banks. The 
improved credit quality is generally observed in the various sectoral portfolios, 
except that of consumer credit, where the NPL ratio increased by 0.5 pp to 5.6% in 
the 12-month period to June 2019. 
However,	from	the	standpoint	of	flows	of	the	resident	private-sector	portfolio,	
the	inflows	of	new	NPLs	quickened	in	the	first	half	of	2019.	In the first six months 
of the year, inflows of NPLs reached €13.5 billion (see Chart 2.5). This behaviour 
represented an increase in NPL inflows with respect to the figure of €12.4 billion in 
the first half of 2018. However, the outflows of write-offs and recoveries were high 
enough to offset the behaviour of inflows, so the total volume of NPLs decreased in 
the first half of 2019.
Foreclosed	assets	decreased	by	€3.3	billion	 in	 the	 first	six	months	of	2019. 
Thus the downward trend of recent years continued (see Chart 2.4). Foreclosed 
assets have fallen by 50% from the high of 2011. Looking at their composition, those 
from construction and real estate development loans continue to account for more 
than half, while the relative proportion of those from household loans for house 
purchase decreased to 26.2%.
The NPL ratio of the resident private sector continued its decline of recent years to stand at 5.3% in June 2019, representing a fall of more 
than 1 pp with respect to the same month a year earlier. Foreclosed assets showed a further fall in June 2019 to stand below €40 billion.
NPL RATIO AND FORECLOSED ASSETS
Chart 2.4
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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The	consolidated	 total	 assets	of	Spanish	deposit	 institutions	grew	year-on-
year	by	3.4%	 in	June	2019.	This was mainly a result of their operations abroad, 
where their financial assets (particularly loans) increased by 10.5% year-on-year, 
while the financial assets of business in Spain decreased by 1.9%. This geographical 
diversification of Spanish banks took their financial assets abroad to above 50% of 
their total financial assets in June 2019.
Loans	 abroad	 from	 Spanish	 banks	 are	 concentrated	 in	 Europe	 and	 Latin	
America. In the last four years the relative weight of loans in the United Kingdom has 
decreased by nearly 5 pp, while that of loans in the rest of Europe has increased by 
more than 10 pp to 29.5%. The relative weight of loans in Latin America decreased 
to stand at 25.5% of total loans abroad in June 2019 (see Chart 2.6).
Consolidated	 non-performing	 assets,	 including	 loans	 and	 debt	 securities,	
decreased	 by	 12.4%	 year-on-year (see Annex 1). Hence the total NPL ratio 
decreased to 3%, down 54 bp from June 2018. In the past four years, NPLs abroad 
have decreased in all jurisdictions except Turkey, where the NPL ratio was 5.9% in 
June 2019 (2.2% in June 2015). The highest decrease in the ratio was in Portugal, 
where it fell by 4.7 pp to 4% (see Chart 2.6). 
Liquidity and financing conditions
In	 June	 2019,	 the	 liquidity	 coverage	 ratio	 (LCR)	 of	 Spanish	 banks	 stood	 at	
162.2%. It thus amply exceeded the regulatory minimum requirement (100%) 
In the first half of 2019, NPLs decreased to €61.9 billion. The rate of fall was more moderate than in previous periods. The rates of change 
of outflows to write-offs and of recoveries were similar to those in 2018 as a whole, while the rate of inflows to new NPLs was higher.
FLOW OF RESIDENT PRIVATE SECTOR NPLs (a)
Business in Spain, ID
Chart 2.5
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Shown beside each bar is the amount, in € billion, of each NPL inflow or outflow. NPLs recovered include non-performing loans that become 
performing again, and foreclosed assets and NPLs sold to third parties. The chart shows annual inflows and outflows to December 2018 and the 
flows in the first half of 2019.
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and also the European average (149.2%). Specifically, the data of the European 
Banking Authority (EBA)1 indicate that the ratio in Spain is higher than in the main 
EU countries. In the past 12 months the LCR has increased in Italy, Spain and 
France, while there has been a decrease in the liquidity of banks in Germany 
and, particularly, the United Kingdom (see Chart 2.7).
The	liquidity	provided	by	the	Eurosystem	to	the	banking	system	will	probably	
increase	as	a	result	of	the	monetary	easing	measures	recently	approved	by	
the ECB. In fact, the decision to reactivate net purchases from 1 November will 
entail a monthly increase in the Eurosystem balance sheet of €20 billion per month, 
following the stability prevailing since the beginning of this year. Meanwhile, the 
volume of refinancing operations has not varied significantly because the bulk of 
them relate to four long-term transactions known as TLTRO-II, which will not mature 
until June 20202 (see Chart 2.8). In March 2019 the Governing Council of the ECB 
decided to launch a new series of seven quarterly transactions between September 
2019 and March 2021 (TLTRO-III), the initial conditions of which were improved 
1 See https://eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/risk-dashboard.
2  Banks have the option of early redemption two years after the settlement of each transaction, which 
explains the decrease in the outstanding balance of these transactions from the €723 billion cited in 
the previous FSR. 
In the past four years, loans to Europe (excluding the United Kingdom) have increased to account for nearly 30% of loans abroad, while loans 
to the United Kingdom and Latin America have decreased by 5 pp. The NPL ratio abroad continues to be uneven across countries, with an 
across-the-board decline, except in Turkey where the ratio stood at 5.9% in June 2019.
LOANS ABROAD
Consolidated data
Chart 2.6
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The chart shows at each date the loans in each geographical area as a proportion of the total loans outside Spain.
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at its meeting on 12 September. The first tender assigned a relatively small amount,3 
possibly because the banks participating in this first tender were not aware of these 
new conditions. Box 1.2 sets out in detail the measures approved by the ECB’s 
Governing Council last September and their implications for financial stability.
Activity	on	 the	unsecured	money	markets	 in	 the	euro	area	continues	 to	be	
very	 low.	 The trading volume on the purely interbank market is very small and 
continues to decrease for the reasons analysed in previous FSRs4 (see Chart 2.8). 
By contrast, deposits at banks placed by financial institutions without access to the 
ECB deposit facility are much larger, as reflected by the higher average volume of 
trading indexed to the €STR rate, which has grown to somewhat more than €37 billion 
in 2019, compared with €2.5 billion of interbank loans indexed to EONIA.5 These 
banks have ample liquidity, partly as a result of the Eurosystem asset purchase 
programmes. This explains why the €STR rate, which also includes these transactions, 
is below the EONIA, which is calculated solely from loans between banks, and below 
3 €3,396 million	granted	to	28	banks.
4	 	Specifically,	the	excess	liquidity	in	the	system,	the	new	regulatory	framework and the preference for 
repo transactions secured by high-quality collateral. 
5	 	The	 reference	 market	 for	 setting	 the	 €STR	 rate	 includes	 all	 bank	 deposits	 placed	 by	 financial	
institutions (not necessarily banks). By contrast, the EONIA is set using as a reference only interbank 
transactions.
The liquidity coverage ratio at European level was 149.2% in June 2019 (compared with 148.3% in June 2018). The EU countries as a whole 
had a ratio above the required minimum of 100%, except for Greece (where it has, however, increased significantly in the past year).
LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO. EUROPEAN COMPARISON
SSM COUNTRIES AND UNITED KINGDOM. June 2019 (a)
Chart 2.7
SOURCE: EBA.
a The data refer to a sample of 150 institutions, and the LCR is calculated as the weighted average of the ratios of each country’s institutions.
b The sovereign debt crisis prompted Greek banks to use their LCR liquidity buffer, resulting in LCR levels below the required minimum of 100% (as 
from December 2017, when Greece reported for the first time on the LCR ratio, which has since stood below 100%). Article 4(3) of Commission 
Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/61 of 10 October 2014 allows liquid assets to be monetised in periods of tension.
c EBA data include Iceland.
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Activity on the unsecured money markets in the euro area continues to be very low, while the secured money markets (repos) increasingly 
account for the bulk of the volume traded on the European markets. In the first three quarters of 2019, Spanish banks stepped up their 
aggregate issuance with respect to the same period of 2018.
WHOLESALE FUNDING
Chart 2.8
SOURCES: Bloomberg, Dealogic, Eikon, Thomson Reuters and Banco de España.
a Includes covered bonds, senior debt, subordinated debt eligible as tier 2 capital and debt eligible as additional tier 1 capital. Retained issues are 
not included.
EONIA €STR
EONIA (20-DAY MOVING AVERAGE) €STR (20-DAY MOVING AVERAGE)
-1,000
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
Jan-08 Jan-10 Jan-12 Jan-14 Jan-16 Jan-18
ASSET PURCHASE PROGRAMMES
MONETARY POLICY LOANS
OTHER ASSETS
EXCESS LIQUIDITY (EXCESS RESERVES + DEPOSIT FACILITY)
1  EUROSYSTEM BALANCE SHEET AND EXCESS LIQUIDITY
€bn
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Q1 Q2
2018
Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2
2019
Q3 Total
Q1-Q3
2018
(right-
hand
scale)
Total
Q1-Q3
2019
(right-
hand
scale)
 MORTGAGE COVERED BONDS  SENIOR DEBT
TIER 2 SUBORDINATED DEBT ADDITIONAL TIER 1 DEBT
€bn €bn
5  MAIN ISSUES OF SPANISH INSTITUTIONS IN MEDIUM- AND LONG-TERM
WHOLESALE MARKETS (a)
0
10
20
30
40
50
Mar-17 Sep-17 Mar-18 Sep-18 Mar-19 Sep-19
€bn
2  TURNOVER IN EU MONEY MARKETS
-0.60
-0.55
-0.50
-0.45
-0.40
-0.35
-0.30
-0.25
-0.20
Mar-17 Sep-17 Mar-18 Sep-18 Mar-19 Sep-19
EONIA €STR DEPOSIT FACILITY
%
3  EU MONEY MARKET RATES
0
5
10
15
20
25
-0.8
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
Jan-18 Apr-18 Jul-18 Oct-18 Jan-19 Apr-19 Jul-19 Oct-19
VOLUME (right-hand scale) INTEREST RATE
€bn
4  EUROPEAN REPO MARKET INTEREST RATES (GC POOLING EUR)
%
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
2016 2017 2018 2019
(Q1-Q3)
 MORTGAGE COVERED BONDS  SENIOR DEBT TIER 2 TIER 1
6  AVERAGE COST OF ISSUANCE FOR DEPOSIT INSTITUTIONS IN MAIN 
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
%
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 61 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, AUTUMN 2019  2 RISKS TO THE FINANCIAL SECTOR AND ITS RESILIENCE
even the deposit facility rate (DFR). In any event, both the EONIA and the €STR 
reflect in full the ECB’s decision to lower the DFR by 10 bp6 (see Chart 2.8). 
The	September	Governing	Council	meeting	also	decided	to	apply	a	two-step	
remuneration	system	to	the	reserves	deposited	by	deposit	institutions	at	the	
central bank. This exempted them from paying the DFR (–0.5%) over an amount 
equal to six times the minimum reserve, which is remunerated at the rate on main 
refinancing operations (0.0%). Assuming that the reserves of Spanish banks in this 
deposit facility do not change, it is estimated that a moderate benefit will result from 
the introduction of this remuneration system. Meanwhile, for those banks with non-
exempt surplus reserves, the positive effect will be partially mitigated by the decline 
in the deposit facility rate to –0.5%, which will somewhat reduce the net effect of the 
two measures announced.
The	secured	money	markets	(repos)	increasingly	account	for	the	bulk	of	the	
volume	 traded	 on	 the	 European	 money	 markets. These markets are used 
by banks to manage their growing need for collateral derived largely from changes 
in banking regulation, against a background of low collateral availability due to 
scant security issuance and the ECB purchase programmes. In this respect, it 
should be noted that at mid-September tensions emerged in the US dollar repo 
market when a sharp rise in repo rates pushed the FED monetary policy reference 
rate to the high band of its target range (which it exceeded on some occasions). 
This event led the FED to intervene7 in order to reduce repo rates to their normal 
levels and keep its official interest rate within the target range. The euro area was 
not affected and the repo rate in fact decreased in line with the cut in the DFR 
(see Chart 2.8).
In	the	first	three	quarters	of	2019,	Spanish	banks	stepped	up	their	issuance	of	
debt	instruments	compared	with	the	same	period	of	2018. However, there was 
a certain unevenness by type of debt instrument, as follows. The volume of covered 
bonds and, in particular, senior debt, increased (see Chart 2.8) and, contrariwise, the 
issuance of subordinated debt, particularly that eligible as additional Tier 1 capital, 
decreased with respect to the same period a year earlier. As to the cost of issuance 
by type of instrument, this showed the opposite behaviour. The cost of subordinated 
debt, whether eligible as Tier 1 or Tier 2, increased, and that of senior debt and 
covered bonds decreased (see Chart 2.8).
The	 outstanding	 balance	 of	 resident	 private-sector	 deposits	 continued	 to	
increase,	 driven	 by	 sight	 deposits.	 The negative interest rate environment 
6 Decision of the ECB Governing Council of 12 September 2019.
7  The interventions were made through a series of overnight repos and three transactions with a 
maturity of 14 days. 
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has caused the remuneration of new time deposits by the resident private sector 
to decrease significantly since 2015 and converge with the interest rates on sight 
deposits, at around 0%.8 It is therefore not surprising that the volume of new 
time deposits has also fallen and in June 2019 it stood below 2% of the outstanding 
balance of sight deposits, compared with relative weights above 15% in 2013 (see 
Chart 2.9). Thus the outstanding balance of time deposits was down to 16.3% of the 
total in June 2019, compared with 53.2% in June 2013, showing year-on-year rates 
of change below –10% since end-2014, as against growth rates above 10% for sight 
deposits (see Chart 2.9).
2.1.2 Profitability and solvency
Profitability
In	the	first	half	of	2019,	the	consolidated	profit	attributable	to	the	parent	entity	
of	 the	 Spanish	 banking	 system	 as	 a	whole	was	 down	 11.5%	 year-on-year.	
8	 	Rates	have	even	turned	negative	 in	the	case	of	non-financial	corporations.	However,	the	negative	
rates seem to be rather exceptional, since the volume of new time deposits is very low (less than 
€5,000 million per month) in comparison with new demand deposits (more than €200,000 million), 
and they relate to specialised operations.
Interest rates on new time deposits by the resident private sector have decreased significantly in recent years to levels near 0%. This trend in 
deposit yields has been accompanied by a lower volume of new time deposits, whose relative weight has fallen with respect to the outstanding 
balance of sight deposits. Furthermore, the outstanding balance of time deposits has also declined, albeit more slowly than in previous years, 
while sight deposits continue to grow.
RETAIL FUNDING
Business in Spain, ID
Chart 2.9
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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Consequently, the returns on assets (ROA) and on equity (ROE)9 fell by 8 bp and 
1 pp, to 0.49% and 6.6%, respectively. As seen in Chart 2.10, the decrease in the 
ROA was broadly based across institutions, although it was larger in the case of 
the more profitable ones. Chart 2.10 also shows that in many institutions the 
decline in the ROA was a result of the fact that the increase in their assets in 
the period was not accompanied by a sufficient improvement in profit to sustain the 
rate of return.
The	decline	in	profit	is	explained	by	a	significant	reduction	in	gains	on	financial	
assets	 and	 liabilities,	 while	 extraordinary	 operating	 expenses	 and,	 for	 the	
first	 time	since	2012,	 impairment	 losses	 increased	 (see Chart 2.11). Gains on 
financial assets and liabilities were down 33% (6 bp in terms of ATA), which resulted 
in a slight decline (0.3%) in gross income. Operating expenses rose by almost 4%, 
leading to a fall in net operating income of 4.5%. The increase in operating expenses 
over the past year has been largely due to agreements to reduce staff at certain 
9	 	To	calculate	the	ROA	and	ROE	ratios	used	in	this	section,	the	numerators	are	net	profit	attributable	to	
the parent entity, while the denominators are four-quarter averages of total assets (ROA) and of 
own	 funds	 (ROE).	 The	 EBA’s	 definition	 of	 the	 ROA	 and	 ROE	 uses	 net	 profit	 after	 tax	 in	 the	
numerators and, for the denominators, the average of the current and the preceding year’s total 
assets (ROA) and total equity (ROE). As a result, there may be small differences between them. 
However,	international	comparisons	use	the	EBA’s	definition	(Chart	2.13),	to	ensure	that	the	ratios	
are calculated in the same way across jurisdictions.
The fall in ROA between June 2018 and June 2019 was broad-based across institutions. Most institutions posted year-on-year growth in ATA, 
although for a large number this did not translate into an increase in profit, or the increase was insufficient to maintain the return on assets.
PROFITABILITY DISTRIBUTION
Consolidated data
Chart 2.10
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The chart shows the density function (or frequency distribution) of the return on assets for Spanish deposit institutions, weighted by average total 
assets. This density function is approximated using a kernel estimator, which makes possible a non-parametric estimation of the density function, 
providing a continuous, smoothed graphic representation of this function.
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institutions. In addition, impairment losses, which had been falling uninterruptedly 
since 2013, rose by 3.9%. Meanwhile, net interest income posted an increase of 
close to 3%, while net fees and commissions remained relatively steady. 
In	business	in	Spain,	operating	expenses	have	remained	flat	since	late	2013. 
As a result, the efficiency ratio and the ratio of operating expenses to total assets 
have deteriorated at most institutions. Specifically, Chart 2.12 shows that the 
efficiency ratio at the individual level, without taking into account compensation for 
dismissals, has increased (worsened) by around nine percentage points since 2014, 
to stand at 56.2%. The ratio of operating expenses to total assets has also increased 
at most institutions. As regards its composition, Chart 2.12 shows that the weight of 
personnel costs has fallen while that of IT and communications, outsourced services 
and depreciation has increased, reflecting to some extent the digitalisation and 
technological transformation being undertaken by institutions. Operating expenses 
are one of the most important levers that institutions can directly control in order to 
increase the profitability of their business.
In	June	2019,	Spanish	 institutions	continue	to	post	consolidated	profitability	
above the European average. EBA data for June 2019 (the latest published),10 show 
that Spain is above major European jurisdictions (see Chart 2.13), with the exception 
10 See https://eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/risk-dashboard.
The fall in net gains on financial assets and liabilities, the increase in operating expenses and the increase in impairment losses were the main 
determinants of the fall in profit in the first half of 2019. Impairment losses increased after six years of continuous decline.
COMPONENTS OF PROFITABILITY
Consolidated data
Chart 2.11
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The red (green) colour of the bars indicates a negative (positive) contribution of the corresponding item to the change in consolidated profit in June 
2019 with respect to June 2018.
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of Italy. The efficiency ratio at consolidated level of the Spanish institutions was among 
the lowest (best) in Europe. Box 1.2 analyses in detail the impact of the new monetary 
policy measures announced by the ECB in September 2019 on the net interest income 
of deposit institutions, beyond the moderate positive impact associated with the two 
tier system of ECB deposit facility rates. An analysis of the comparative profitability of 
European and US banks and how this is valued by the market can be found in Box 2.1.
The cost-to-income ratio (excluding compensation for dismissal) at the individual deposit institution level for business in Spain has increased 
(deteriorated) since 2014. This increase has been accompanied by a higher ratio of operating expenses to total assets for deposit 
institutions. During these years the weights of IT and communication costs, outsourced services and depreciation in total operating 
expenses have increased, while the weight of personnel costs has fallen.
OPERATING EXPENSES AND COST-TO-INCOME RATIO
Business in Spain, ID
Chart 2.12
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The cost-to-income ratio is defined as the ratio of operationg expenses to gross income. The June 2019 data have been annualised.
b This panel shows the density function (or frequency distribution) of operating expenses as a percentage of total assets for deposit institutions. This 
density function is approximated using a kernel estimator, which makes possible a non-parametric estimation of the density function, providing a 
continuous, smoothed graphic representation of this function.
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Solvency
The	 ratio	 that	 measures	 the	 highest	 quality	 capital,	 common	 equity	 Tier	 1	
(CET1),	increased	by	36	bp	over	the	12	months	to	June	2019,	to	stand	at	12.2%. 
Similarly, the Tier-1 and total capital ratios rose by 37 and 32 bp,11 to stand at 13.6% 
and 15.4%, respectively (see Chart 2.14). This improvement in institutions’ solvency 
occurred in a context of rising risk-weighted assets (1.1% year-on-year), and despite 
the negative impact of the introduction of IFRS 16 on criteria for the recognition, 
11  The fully-loaded CET1 ratio stood at 11.9% in June 2019, having increased by 0.5 pp since June 
2018. As the Basel III regime had been almost completely implemented by June 2019, the difference 
between the CET1 ratio (applying the phase-in schedule laid down by the regulation) and its fully 
loaded version (applying the rules in force at the end of the implementation period) is small.
The return on assets of the main Spanish deposit institutions stands above the European average (0.47%) and is higher than in the main EU 
economies. Their cost-to-income ratio, meanwhile, is among the lowest (best) in the EU, standing slightly above 50%.
EUROPEAN COMPARISON OF PROFITABILITY AND EFFICIENCY MEASURES
SSM COUNTRIES AND UNITED KINGDOM. June 2019
Consolidated data
Chart 2.13
SOURCE: EBA.
a The cost-to-income ratio is defined as the ratio of operating expenses and depreciation to net operating income.
b EBA data include Iceland.
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valuation and presentation of lease agreements which is estimated as –9 bp of CET1 
on average in the sector.
The	 two	 largest	 institutions	 in	 the	 Spanish	 banking	 system	 were	 mainly	
responsible	for	the	improvement	in	the	CET1	ratio. It can be seen in Chart 2.15 
how, over the past year, more institutions increased their CET1 ratio than reduced it, 
although the difference is not large. As regards the composition of the CET1, capital 
and reserves account for more than 90% of the eligible items. Indeed, the increase 
in reserves, explains most of the recorded increase in solvency. Minority interests 
represent 6%, while transitional adjustments, as a consequence of the practically 
complete implementation of the CRR/CRD IV, have a weight of only 2%. Most of the 
deductions correspond to goodwill and other intangible assets (see Chart 2.15).
Notwithstanding	these	developments,	in	June	2019	Spanish	institutions	had,	on	
average,	lower	levels	of	solvency	relative	to	other	European	countries.	Chart 2.16 
presents a Europe-wide comparison of two solvency measures, the CET1 ratio (panel 1) 
and the leverage ratio (panel 2), based on the latest data published by the EBA.12 Spanish 
institutions have a CET1 ratio almost 3 pp below the European average, although above 
the regulatory minimum requirement. As regards the leverage ratio, Spain was 
above the largest European jurisdictions, but still in the lower half of the ranking.
12 See https://eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/risk-dashboard.
Between June 2018 and June 2019, the CET1 ratio increased by 36 bp to stand at 12.2%, while the Tier 1 and total capital ratios increased 
by similar magnitudes. Risk weighted assets grew by 1.1% over the same period.
CAPITAL AND RISK WEIGHTED ASSETS
Consolidated data
Chart 2.14
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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One	reason	why	the	CET1	ratio	of	Spanish	institutions	is	lower	than	that	of	their	
European	 peers	 is	 the	 greater	 use	 by	 Spanish	 banks	 of	 the	 standardised	
approach	(SA)	to	calculate	their	capital	requirements.	Under the SA, institutions 
that do not apply their own internal models (IRB) all use the same risk weights for the 
different portfolios which are generally higher than those in IRB models. Previous 
editions of the FSR have explained in detail how, in comparison with the use of internal 
models, use of the SA is associated with a higher risk-weighted assets (RWAs) 
density.13, 14
On	the	other	hand,	there	do	not	appear	to	be	significant	differences	between	
Spanish	banks	and	those	of	other	European	countries	as	regards	the	densities	
obtained using IRB models. The average RWA density in IRB portfolios can be 
compared for the institutions of the main European banking sectors that participated 
in the transparency exercise published by the EBA in 2018 using the data obtained in 
that exercise (to June 2018). The Spanish institutions that use internal IRB models to 
manage credit risk are distributed relatively homogenously among the European 
institutions in terms of RWA density (see Chart 2.17). In short, the analysis of densities 
13 See FSR of May 2018 and FSR of May 2017. 
14	 	The	RWA	density	of	a	portfolio	is	defined	as	the	ratio	of	the	volume	of	risk-weighted	assets	to	the	
gross volume of such assets (without applying risk weights).
In terms of institutions, although there is no great difference, the number of those whose CET1 ratio increased over the past year is greater 
than the number of those whose ratio declined. The main components of the CET1 are capital instruments and reserves, which represent 
more than 90% of their eligible items.
CHANGE AND COMPOSITION OF THE CET1 CAPITAL RATIO
Consolidated data
Chart 2.15
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The points above the bisector show growth (declines) in the volume of CET1 over the past year higher (lower) than the growth (decline) in the volume 
of RWAs; accordingly, they would correspond to increases in the CET1 ratio between June 2018 and June 2019. The opposite occurs for points 
below the bisector.
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in the private sector credit portfolio of institutions that use IRB models does not help 
to explain the relative position of Spanish institutions in the European solvency ranking.
The	Basel	III	framework	reform	agreed	in	2017	introduces	restrictions	on	IRB	
models,	 in	 particular	 an	 output	 floor	 to	 capital	 requirements.	 Among other 
important measures, the Basel III reform introduces restrictions on the models used 
by institutions to value the risks they incur (limits on their use and on the parameters 
estimated in the method based on internal credit risk ratings), improvements to the 
risk sensitivity of the standardised approach for credit risk and, in particular, an 
output floor. This quantification of risk is a key element in determining RWAs, which 
are the basis for calculating institutions’ capital requirements. 
The	aim	of	the	output	floor	is	to	place	a	limit	on	the	benefits	a	bank	can	obtain	
by	using	IRB	models,	so	that	its	impact	is	greater	in	jurisdictions	where	this	
The CET1 ratio for the main Spanish deposit institutions is in last place, while their leverage ratio stands slightly above the European average, 
and above the main EU countries.
EUROPEAN COMPARISON OF SOLVENCY MEASURES
SSM COUNTRIES AND UNITED KINGDOM. June 2019
Consolidated data
Chart 2.16
SOURCE: EBA.
a EBA data include Iceland.
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type	of	model	is	used	more	intensively.	 It should be noted that the new output 
floor replaces the existing Basel II floor with a more robust, risk-sensitive floor, based 
on the revised Basel III standardised approaches. Thus, the output floor attempts 
to place a limit on the benefit a bank can obtain by using internal models to calculate 
its minimum capital requirements, helping to improve the comparability, credibility 
and transparency of the capital ratios and in short, to help ensure a level playing field 
for banks, in terms of the calculation of capital requirements.
Analysis	of	the	reforms	shows	that	the	greater	impact	in	Europe	stems	from	
the	output	floor	to	capital	requirements	 (see Chart 2.18). In order to assess the 
impact of these measures on banks’ capital requirements, the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the EBA have both performed quantitative impact 
studies (QISs) of the new prudential regulations. The latest regular monitoring report 
of the BCBS presents these aggregate impacts for internationally active banks in 
three geographical areas: Europe, the Americas and the rest of the world. 
The	 largest	 impacts	 of	 the	 floor	 to	 capital	 requirements	 for	 the	 sample	 of	
countries	 and	 banks	 used,	 are	 concentrated	 in	 Sweden,	 Denmark	 and	
Germany,	according	to	the	July	2019	EBA	report.15 Other countries in which the 
15  Report in response to the request for advise issued by the European Commission in which the 
impact of the Basel III reforms is studied.
The density of the RWAs in IRB portfolios is highly heterogeneous, both among the main banking sectors of the EU and at the level of the 
institutions that use internal models for credit risk management. Spanish institutions that use IRB models are distributed relatively uniformly 
across the various RWA density ranges.
EUROPEAN COMPARISON OF RWA DENSITY IN THE IRB PORTFOLIO (a)
MAIN SSM COUNTRIES AND UNITED KINGDOM. June 2018
Consolidated data
Chart 2.17
SOURCE: EBA.
a Weighted density of the main credit portfolios (businesses, retail and secured by real estate) of the institutions participating in the EBA's transparency 
exercise that use advanced IRB models for credit risk management.
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floor to requirements accounts for a significant proportion of the impact of the Basel 
III reform are Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, France and Belgium. Such impacts 
tend to be concentrated among a relatively small set of banks where the difference 
between the capital calculations under internal models and those resulting from the 
application of the standardised approach is greatest. These estimated impacts may 
be smaller, since they assume that institutions keep other capital buffers that they 
currently have unchanged, e.g. Pillar 2 capital requirements (P2R and P2G), combined 
requirements and voluntary buffers. 
2.1.3  Forward-looking assessment of the Spanish banking system’s 
resilience
The	 methodology	 used	 for	 the	 Banco	 de	 España’s	 stress	 tests,	 known	 
by	the	acronym	FLESB	(Forward	Looking	Exercise	on	Spanish	Banks),	was	
applied	 to	 the	2019-2021	horizon	 to	measure	Spanish	banks’	 resilience	 in	
terms	of	solvency	and	liquidity. The Banco de España designed FLESB using 
a top-down approach, under which a set of models developed internally are 
applied to the information available from regulatory and supervisory reports.16 
16  The bottom-up methodology is an alternative approach to banking sector stress tests in which the 
banks themselves make the estimates applying their own models and databases. The EBA’s biennial 
stress test uses a constrained bottom-up approach, under which banks apply a bottom-up 
approach that is partially restricted by the methodological guidelines set by the EBA. 
Analysis of the impact of the Basel III framework reform shows that the greatest impact in Europe arises from the output floor, which is 
designed to limit the benefits that a bank can obtain by using IRB models, to ensure a level playing field for all banks.
IMPACTS ON MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS OF THE APPLICATION OF BASEL III
Change to current requirements (a)
Chart 2.18
SOURCE: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
a The length and direction of each arrow indicate the size and sign of the relative change in the capital requirements as a consequence of the impact of 
Basel III on the corresponding items indicated on the horizontal axis. The point of each arrow indicates the relative change resulting from accumulation 
of the impacts of Basel III on the corresponding item on the horizontal axis, and on all the items to the left of the latter.
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Among other developments, a more comprehensive analysis of sovereign exposures 
has been incorporated this year.
The	 baseline	 scenario	 for	 the	 solvency	 exercise	 consists	 of	 the	 Banco	 de	
España’s	macroeconomic	projections	published	in	2019	H1. Under the adverse 
scenario there is a downturn in economic activity and a correction of the value of 
financial assets in line with the identification of risks in this FSR. It should be borne 
in mind that the adverse scenario does not reflect Spanish authorities’ economic 
expectations. Rather, it is based on hypothetical assumptions for assessing 
the banking sector’s resilience. In other words, it is a highly unlikely scenario. 
Likewise, it is important to note that the Banco de España’s latest projection exercise 
revised growth forecasts downwards and, therefore, the baseline scenario used in 
the exercise is slightly optimistic. Lastly, these scenarios are global in scope, as they 
include projections not only for the Spanish economy, but also for the countries that 
are relevant for Spanish banks.
The	baseline	scenario	assumes	a	moderate	slowdown	in	GDP	in	the	period	2019-
2021	and	the	adverse	scenario	considers	a	recession	in	2019-2020.	Specifically, 
under the baseline scenario GDP would accumulate growth of 5.9% in three years, 
against a 1.7% decline under the adverse scenario (see Chart 2.19). This is a difference 
of 7.6 pp, which is stricter in terms of severity than the 7.4 pp difference in the 2018 
FLESB exercise, whose scenarios were the same as those applied in the EU-wide 
stress test conducted by the EBA. The changes in the unemployment rate and in house 
prices under the scenarios are consistent with this behaviour of GDP. Thus, the 
unemployment rate drops to 12.3% under the baseline scenario, but rises to 16.5% 
under the adverse scenario. House prices decrease by 15.5% under the adverse 
scenario, against cumulative growth of 14.4% under the baseline scenario. Finally, the 
3-month interbank interest rate exhibits a 70 bp difference between the baseline and 
adverse scenarios for 2021, reflecting the widespread increase in interest rates17 which 
would result from materialisation of the risk of a rise in risk premia, and also entailing a 
decline in the value of fixed-income and equity instruments. 
For	 the	 liquidity	 analysis,	 the	 scenarios	 are	 defined	 in	 terms	 of	 fund	 outflow	
coefficients	applied	to	the	liquidity	coverage	ratio	(LCR). Specifically, the baseline 
scenario uses the regulatory coefficients for 30-day fund outflows set by the BCBS and 
the EBA. The Banco de España defines the adverse scenario by introducing additional 
stress in these coefficients, based on past experience in Spain.18 The reference date is 
December 2018. 
17  In these types of exercises, it is assumed that economic policies, particularly monetary policy, do not 
react.
18	 	The	 same	 fund	 outflow	 coefficients	 that	 were	 considered	 last	 year	 were	 used	 for	 the	 adverse	
scenario. See FSR, Banco de España, November 2018, page 74.
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Results yielded by the FLESB methodology. Solvency
The	57	banks	taking	part	in	the	exercise	are	divided	into	three	groups	based	
on	supervisory	scope	and	international	activity.	The first group consists of the 
Spanish banks under the direct supervision of the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
(SSM) with significant international activity, the second group consists of the other 
significant Spanish banks under direct SSM supervision and the third group 
comprises other banks. The banks in the third group are smaller, less complex, 
supervised directly by the Banco de España and do not engage in significant 
international activity.19 This segmentation, which reflects the differences in banks’ 
19 For further information see FSR, Banco de España, November 2018, page 76.
The difference in the nature of the scenarios is reflected in the changes in the macro variables that define them. The baseline scenario 
assumes a growth path with a slight slowdown and a small rise in the interest rate. By contrast, under the adverse scenario there is a 
pronounced contraction of activity accompanied by a significant increase in the interest rate.
MACROECONOMIC SCENARIOS
Chart 2.19
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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business models and sources of risk, coincides with that used in the FLESB 
exercises of previous years. 
The	 group	 of	 banks	 supervised	 by	 the	 SSM	 with	 significant	 international	
activity20	shows	a	1.2 pp	improvement	in	their	CET1	ratio	under	the	baseline	
scenario	and	a	0.4 pp	fall	under	 the	adverse	scenario. Chart 2.20 shows the 
results for the first group of banks. In this case, estimates of the performance of 
business outside Spain are also incorporated in the impact on solvency. As can be 
seen, the gross losses in Spain under the baseline scenario (4.2% of RWAs) are 
absorbed by the use of existing provisions (2.7% of RWAs) and by profit generation 
(5.2% of RWAs). The other impacts have a negative effect on the solvency ratio 
(2.5%), due to loan growth, which flows through to higher RWAs, and to the effect 
of taxes and profit distributions. The severity of the macroeconomic conditions 
under the adverse scenario prompts greater losses (6.6%), which cannot be fully 
absorbed by use of existing provisions (2.7%) or by profit generation (3.3%), so 
solvency decreases. Note that, under this scenario, the other impacts have a slightly 
positive contribution (0.1%), since loans diminish and the tax burden and distributions 
decrease largely owing to the absence of profits.
For	the	other	banks	supervised	by	the	SSM,	the	baseline	scenario	produces	
an	improvement	of	0.7	pp	in	the	CET1	ratio	and	the	adverse	scenario	prompts	
a	 fall	of	2.7	pp. Chart 2.21 shows that this group starts from a more favourable 
20 See FSR, Banco de España, November 2017, footnote 7 of Chapter 2.
Banks with significant international exposure maintain a solid level of solvency even at the end of the adverse scenario. To this contributes a 
contained volume of losses and robust profit generation, both of which are favoured by geographical diversification.
IMPACT ON CET1 FL RATIO
INSTITUTIONS WITH SIGNIFICANT INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITY
Chart 2.20
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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solvency position than banks with significant international activity, since its initial 
CET1 ratio is 12.3%. However, it evolves less favourably during the year both under 
the baseline scenario, where the CET1 ratio rises by 0.7 pp in 2020 (compared with 
1.2 pp for the first group), and under the adverse scenario, where it falls by 2.7 pp 
(compared with 0.4 pp). Under the adverse scenario, there is a highly significant 
increase in the volume of losses (12.5% of RWAs), such that the available loss 
absorbing elements are clearly insufficient to cover them by the use of provisions 
(5.4% of RWAs) and by profit generation (4.3% of RWAs). This weaker relative 
performance is because these banks do not benefit from the international 
diversification of the first group, which proved to be a robust source of profit 
generation during the past crisis. The concentration of their business in Spain, 
where the adverse scenario envisages a notable fall in economic activity and in real 
estate prices, has a significant impact on them through their exposures to credit risk 
and to foreclosed assets.
The banks under direct national supervision21	increase	their	CET1	ratio	by	1	
pp	under	the	baseline	scenario,	while	under	the	adverse	scenario	it	falls	by	
0.6	pp.	These banks perform more strongly than those of the previous group despite 
the fact that their operations are also concentrated in Spain, because are less 
exposed to credit risk and to the real estate sector. Chart 2.22 shows that under 
21	 	This	 FSR	 considers	 a	 sample	 of	 45	 LSIs	 (less	 significant	 institutions,	 according	 to	 the	 SSM’s	
supervisory	 classification),	which	 includes	 the	 savings	banks	and	credit	 cooperatives	along	with	
other	less	significant	institutions	(OLSIs).
Despite a significant increase in losses under the adverse scenario, mainly owing to greater exposure to real estate risk, other SSM 
institutions adequately contend with this scenario and maintain at the end of the year a CET1 ratio above the minimum thresholds required.
IMPACT ON CET1 FL RATIO
OTHER SSM INSTITUTIONS
Chart 2.21
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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the adverse scenario the volume of losses (9.7% of RWAs) exceeds that of the 
instruments which can absorb them, namely provisions (5.6%) and profit generation 
(3.3%), with a positive contribution (0.2%) from other impacts. The final CET1 ratio at 
the end of the exercise is 16.5%, the highest of the three groups, influenced by an initial 
CET1 ratio of 17.1%.  
Consequently,	 at	 aggregate	 level	 the	 Spanish	 deposit	 institutions	 in	 the	
aforementioned	three	groups	have	an	adequate	solvency	position	in	the	event	
of	materialisation	of	the	risks	identified	under	the	adverse	scenario.	Compared 
with the previous year’s exercise, there is a lower impact under the adverse scenario, 
despite it being slightly more severe. This is mainly due to the lower losses, made 
possible by the improved credit quality of the assets and the lower exposure to real 
estate risk. It should, however, be noted that the aggregate profit generation of all 
the groups is slightly lower than a year earlier, evidencing the tight profit environment 
in which Spanish banks are currently operating.  
Despite	 these	 results,	 banks	 must	 not	 relax	 in	 their	 efforts	 to	 raise	 their	
solvency	 level. It should be taken into account that there is a certain degree of 
heterogeneity among the banks comprising each group. Also, there is a possibility 
that a bank may undergo an idiosyncratic shock additional to the systemic shock 
envisaged under the adverse scenario, and a chance that the risk may materialise in 
an economic downturn even more severe than that considered here. Indeed, the 
current macroeconomic projections of the Banco de España are somewhat more 
pessimistic than the baseline scenario used for the FLESB exercise. Stress tests 
The group of banks under direct national supervision maintains a very high level of solvency under the adverse scenario. A more conservative 
profile contributes to this, translating into a less significant volume of losses than that observed for the other SSM banks, albeit with 
comparatively lower profit generation.
IMPACT ON CET1 FL RATIO
LESS SIGNIFICANT INSTITUTIONS
Chart 2.22
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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supplement, but cannot replace, other risk analysis tools of the Banco de España, 
including most notably the microprudential supervision of deposit institutions. All this 
advises that banks pursue a prudent, responsible policy of strengthening their capital 
insofar as the profits generated in a favourable macroeconomic setting so allow.
Sensitivity analyses. Sovereign exposures
Based	 on	 this	 stress	 test,	 a	 complementary	 sensitivity	 analysis	 was	
conducted. Its purpose was to assess how the solvency test results are affected by 
the accounting classification of the sovereign debt portfolio, i.e. by their treatment as 
exposures at amortised cost or at fair value.
The	 sovereign	 debt	 held	 by	 banks	may	 be	 accounted	 for	 at	 fair	 value	 or	 at	
amortised cost. In the first case, the changes in its market value are taken immediately 
to the bank’s P/L or equity. By contrast, in the second case the valuation of the 
securities on the balance sheet is not subject to continual review, since the bank 
intends to hold them to maturity. This is extremely important for stress tests when 
one of the risks crystallising under the adverse scenario is a decrease in the value of 
these assets. Hence, this sensitivity test reproduces the results of the exercise under 
the assumption that all the sovereign exposure is classified at fair value.  
Banks under direct national supervision are, by far, the ones most sensitive to the accounting classification of sovereign exposure. They are 
followed by the other SSM banks and, lastly, by banks with significant international activity. This greater sensitivity is the result of the greater 
weight of sovereign exposures in total assets, as well as the greater weight of exposures recognised at amortised cost.
ANALYSIS OF SENSITIVITY TO THE ACCOUNTING CLASSIFICATION OF SOVEREIGN EXPOSURES
Chart 2.23
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The percentage of sovereign exposure that is recognised at amortised cost (i.e. not recognised at fair value) and the ratio of sovereign exposure 
to total assets are shown for each group of banks as at December 2018.
b The additional consumption in pp of the CET1 ratio that would result under the adverse scenario if the sovereign exposure recognised at amortised 
cost were re-classified at fair value is shown for each group of banks for the period 2019-2021.
42.9
63.9
68.3
13.7 15.8
27.4
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Other SSM institutions Less significant
institutions
TOTAL AMORTISED COST/TOTAL SOVEREIGN EXPOSURE
TOTAL SOVEREIGN EXPOSURE/TOTAL ASSETS
1  SOVEREIGN EXPOSURES (a)
December 2018
%
-1.0
-1.5
-2.8
-3.0
-2.5
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
SSM institutions 
with international 
activity
SSM institutions 
with international 
activity
Other SSM institutions Less significant
institutions
2  SENSITIVITY TO THE ACCOUNTING CLASSIFICATION OF SOVEREIGN 
EXPOSURE (b), ADVERSE SCENARIO. CHANGE IN CET1 RATIO
pp (CET1 ratio)
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 78 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, AUTUMN 2019  2 RISKS TO THE FINANCIAL SECTOR AND ITS RESILIENCE
If	 all	 the	sovereign	exposure	were	measured	at	 fair	 value,	 there	would	be	a	
general decrease in the CET1 ratio under the adverse scenario. Specifically, 
Chart 2.23 shows an additional decrease of 1 pp in the CET1 ratio of the banks with 
international operations, of 1.5 pp in the other SSM banks and of 2.8 pp in those 
under direct national supervision. The extent of the additional impacts depends on 
two factors. First, the relative weight of the sovereign exposure in total assets 
(13.7%, 15.8% and 27.4%, respectively). Second, the relative weight of the portfolios 
measured at amortised cost in the total sovereign exposure (42.9%, 63.9% and 
68.3%, respectively). It is these exposures measured at amortised cost which are 
affected by the sensitivity analysis when they are reclassified to the fair value portfolio.
Results yielded by the FLESB methodology. Liquidity 
The	 aggregate	 LCR	 for	 each	 group	 of	 banks	 stands	 above	 the	 minimum	
requirement	 (100%)	under	 the	adverse	scenario.	As also occurred last year, the 
liquidity position of the less significant institutions was particularly notable, since, even 
under the adverse scenario, they had a ratio of 355% (see Chart 2.24). In general, this 
was due to the substantial portfolio of low-return but high-liquidity assets held by them.
2.1.4 Changes in operational risks
Operational	risk	represents	9.3%	of	the	volume	of	RWAs	of	Spanish	deposit	
institutions. In June 2018, the Spanish banking sector was ranked fourth by volume 
The ample liquidity starting point of all the groups of banks allows them to maintain a LCR above the minimum threshold of 100% under the 
adverse scenario, for which fund outflow coefficients that are even more stringent than those defined in the original rules are applied.
IMPACT ON THE LCR
Chart 2.24
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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of RWAs linked to operational risk (€134  billion) according to the data of the 
EBA’s latest transparency exercise (Chart 2.25). The operational risk of Spanish 
banks stands at 9.3%, relative to total RWAs, which is lower than the European 
average (10.5%) and that of the largest countries. The deterioration of solvency 
associated with an operational risk event may be high according to historical 
experience. Indeed, for European banks affected by the largest operational 
events, it has held at above 1.25 pp of CET1 over the last five years and rose to 
2.1 pp in 2018.
The	potential	materialisation	of	costs	associated	with	legal	risks	continues	to	
contribute	to	the	operational	risk	of	Spanish	deposit	institutions.	Proceedings 
linked to past lawsuits such as those on floor clauses, with an estimated cost of 
more than €2.2 billion for the sector until June 2019, have already taken place, but 
there is a possibility of further litigation. For instance, in 2018 credit card-related 
claims filed with the Banco de España increased considerably, as did litigation on 
the terms and conditions of revolving credit agreements, in particular, regarding 
deferred payment cards. This suggests a potential increase in litigation in this 
segment of the banking business. 
Operational risk-related RWAs at European level stood below 15% of total RWAs in June 2018. Spain was ranked fourth by volume of RWAs, 
although operational risk-related RWAs as a proportion of total RWAs stood at 9.3 %, which is lower than the European average (10.5%), 
and that of the largest European countries. The five highest operational risk losses recorded in Europe, as a percentage of CET1, remained 
relatively stable between 2014 and 2017 (between 1.2% and 1.5%), albeit rising substantially in 2018 (2.1%).
OPERATIONAL RISK
MAIN SSM COUNTRIES AND UNITED KINGDOM
Consolidated data
Chart 2.25
SOURCE: EBA.
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The CJEU has still not issued a ruling on the question of the use of the mortgage 
loan reference index (IRPH by its Spanish abbreviation) as a benchmark in 
variable-rate mortgage loan agreements. As a prior step to the ruling, the 
Advocate General’s conclusions on this matter were published on 10 September, 
however, they do not determine the CJEU’s final ruling.
Other operational risks indicated in the previous FSR in relation to Brexit 
and to the changeover in European settlement systems and benchmark 
indices are still present. The Brexit process continues to raise issues about the 
operations of Central Counterparties (CCPs) which were considered in Box 1.1. 
The consolidation of TARGET2 and TARGET2-Securities planned for 2021 
continues to pose a technological challenge and the transition from EONIA to 
€STR should be completed in 2020.
The reform of the Euribor introduces methodological improvements to make 
it more robust and to have it properly reflect financing conditions in the 
interbank market. Under the European Union Benchmarks Regulation, 
compulsory conditions affecting the Euribor are imposed so that it can be used in 
financial instruments and contracts after 31 December 2021. In this respect, the 
reform of the Euribor towards a hybrid methodology22 developed by EMMI, its 
administrator, was authorised last July by the Belgian authority, FSMA; accordingly, 
it may be used from 1 January 2020 in new and existing contracts and instruments. 
As a result, the gradual implementation of the new methodology will have to be 
concluded in the course of 2019 Q4.
Euribor indices are based on the voluntary contribution of a panel of banks. 
In this respect, one potential risk would be if a significant number of institutions 
decided to refrain from participating. To cover for that eventuality, Article 28 of the 
Regulation requires banks that use any benchmark index to have detailed plans 
on the measures to be taken if the benchmark index should cease to be provided, 
indicating one or several alternative indices. For this reason, a working group 
comprising representatives of large European banks is addressing the transition 
from EONIA, which is scheduled to be phased out by January 2022, to the €STR 
and for the introduction of reserve indices for all the indices used.23 
Lastly, the growing importance of risks related to cybersecurity for the 
financial sector needs to be underlined in this area. Technological innovation 
and the changes in the expectations of customers who expect tailored products 
22  According to this methodology, the 18 banks which contribute to the panel will supply information 
in the following order: i) use of data on transactions, ii) performance of estimations if sufficient data 
are not available, iii) use of other market data.
23  On 14 March 2019 the WG-RFR published its recommendation for a methodology based on OIS 
quotes to set up an €STR-based rate structure as an alternative to Euribor-linked contracts.
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and continuous multi-channel availability of new services have compelled financial 
institutions to develop their technological systems. This has frequently compelled 
them to adopt technologies which have not been tested sufficiently and to become 
increasingly reliant on services provided by third parties, which blurs the perimeter 
of the organisation that needs to be protected. Furthermore, the concentration of 
cloud-based services in the hands of a small number of unregulated, unsupervised 
suppliers is increasing and they are becoming critical points in financial 
infrastructure.
The costs associated with the materialisation of cyber risks include both 
the direct economic impact and indirect damage associated with a loss of 
confidence and the interconnections between institutions. Direct economic 
loss, as a result of the materialisation of these cyber risks, would be associated 
with institutions’ incapacity to provide services to their customers or failure to 
meet their contractual and legal obligations with the subsequent impact on 
reputation and increase in litigation. Preventing these incidents also entails 
increased spending on infrastructure and the need to have skilled employees. If 
the high level of interconnectedness between the various industry participants 
is considered, cyber risks may ultimately affect the stability of the system as 
a whole.
A set of European rules geared towards preventing and mitigating cyber risks 
already exists, although it is somewhat fragmented and, thus, potentially less 
effective when applied. The set of rules includes the Directive on the Protection of 
Critical Infrastructures, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the Network 
Information Security Directive (NISD) and the Revised Payment Service Directive 
(PSD2). 
As a result of the multiple rules on cyber risks, financial institutions have to 
notify numerous authorities about cybersecurity incidents. Specifically, if an 
incident of this type were to affect a Spanish institution deemed to be a critical 
infrastructure and were to have an impact on the payment users’ personal data, 
the institution would have to notify the following national and European authorities: 
i) by virtue of the NISD, the National Institute of Cybersecurity Response Centre 
(INCIBE-CERT by its Spanish abbreviation) (Ministry of the Economy and 
Enterprise) must be notified and since it is a critical infrastructure, the National 
Centre for the Protection of Critical Infrastructures (CNPIC by its Spanish 
abbreviation) (Ministry of the Interior) would take control; ii) under the PSD2 and 
GDPR rules, respectively, the institution would have to inform the Banco de 
España and the Spanish Data Protection Agency; iii) according to banking 
supervision regulations the SSM would have to be notified, if the institution is 
significant. These notification obligations have different time frames and involve 
sending different forms, which increases the risk of a lack of coordination and the 
administrative workload related to the incident.
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2.2  Non-banking financial sector and systemic interconnections
2.2.1 Non-banking financial sector 
The non-banking financial sector analysed in this section has shown a 
more expansionary profile in recent years. In the low-interest rate setting 
prevailing in recent years, the performance of the specialised lending institutions, 
insurance companies, investment funds and pensions funds analysed in this 
subsection, generally shows an increase in activity with broadly positive 
profitability levels.
Specialised lending institutions
Specialised lending institutions (SLIs) concentrate specifically on granting 
credit and cannot take deposits from the general public. They are particularly 
significant in the consumer credit segment which accounts for around 50% of their 
total portfolio. Many SLIs, representing 80% of these institutions’ total lending, are 
part of national banking groups. At aggregate level they represent 4% of lending to 
the private sector and 23% of consumer credit.
Over recent years, in contrast with the decline observed in deposit institutions, 
the credit granted by SLIs has grown steadily at year-on-year rates that have 
held at around 10%. For instance, in June 2019 total lending to the resident private 
sector grew by 11% compared with June 2018 and quickened slightly with respect 
to previous quarters (Chart 2.26).
Having posted significant declines, these institutions’ non-performing loans 
are now showing positive year-on-year changes. This is the result of SLIs 
specialising in riskier business segments such as consumer loans. However, the non-
performing loans ratio remains contained for the moment, owing to the robust increases 
in the ratio’s denominator (credit).
These institutions’ profitability is substantially higher than that of deposit-
taking institutions’ business in Spain. The income statements of SLIs have 
remained stable in recent years, of note are the weight of net interest income and the 
growth of fee and commission income, which have offset the considerable rise in 
impairment losses in recent quarters.
Insurance companies
The main insurance companies in Spain have increased their assets in recent 
years, whereas their return on investment has held relatively stable. 
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Over recent years, in contrast with deposit institutions, the credit granted by SLIs has grown steadily at year-on-year rates that have held at 
around 10%. Non-performing loans declined considerably and then posted positive year-on-year changes.
SPECIALISED LENDING INSTITUTIONS
Business in Spain. ID
Chart 2.26
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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In Spain, the insurance sector’s volume of assets has increased in recent years. The sector’s solvency has remained relatively stable, 
whereas the return on assets held at above 2%.
INSURANCE COMPANIES
Consolidated data
Chart 2.27
SOURCE: SNL Financial and information published by entities.
a Liquidity is defined as the ratio of cash and liquid deposits to total liabilities.
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Since 2015, the insurance sector’s24 volume of assets has grown constantly and to a 
greater extent than the assets consolidated in the balance sheets of banks and, 
consequently, the latter’s significance in this sector has declined (Chart 2.27). This 
greater size was not accompanied by an improvement in the sector’s liquidity, which 
has fallen. Solvency levels have remained stable.25 Finally, the sector’s return on 
assets (ROA), which dipped somewhat last year, remains above 2%, whereas ROE 
slightly exceeded 15% last year, which is considerably higher than the banking 
sector’s profitability ratios.
Investment funds
In the year to date, investment funds’ assets have increased slightly as a result 
of positive returns. Since the second half of 2018, net subscriptions of investment 
funds, which had grown since 2013, have remained flat or declined slightly. In 2019, 
as a result of the positive returns in six of the first eight months of the year, investment 
funds’ net assets have increased by 4.3% (Chart 2.28).
24  The information analysed here, which is drawn from SNL Financial’s database, relates to Spain’s 
main insurance companies, which represent approximately 84% of the insurance sector’s assets.
25  The decrease in the solvency ratio in 2016 is due to the change in regulation associated to the 
implementation of the Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 
November 2009.
In the year to date, investment funds’ net asset values have increased slightly as a result of positive returns, since net subscriptions have 
remained flat.
INVESTMENT FUNDS
Chart 2.28
SOURCES: Inverco and CNMV.
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Pension funds
Also in this case, it is the pick-up in returns which explains the increase in 
pension funds’ assets in 2019. Pension funds’ assets stood at historical highs 
(Chart 2.29). Net contributions to pension funds (adjusted for the value of benefits) 
have shown negative values since end-2018 (–0.2% of net assets at end-2018), and 
a clearly decreasing pattern over time. However, these funds’ assets climbed steadily 
during 2019 (1.6% in year-on-year terms) due to a higher contribution from profitability.
2.2.2 Systemic interconnections
This FSR analyses the direct interconnections of the resident financial system 
with non-resident financial institutions and examines indirect interconnections 
through exposures to marketable securities.26 Direct interconnections between 
resident financial sectors and changes in them in recent years, shown in the 2019 
Spring FSR, have remained stable. Their analysis is not updated in this issue.
26  Direct interconnections refer to financial instruments issued by a financial institution and held by 
another financial institution belonging to the same or another financial sector. Indirect inter-
connections arise where different financial institutions hold exposures to the same sectors, markets 
or instruments. 
Pension funds’ net assets grew in 2019 compared with the slowdown experienced in 2018. Net contributions remained negative which 
extended their decreasing trend, while returns started to pick up after posting negative values in 2018.
PENSION FUNDS
Chart 2.29
SOURCES: Inverco and CNMV.
a The data available on net contributions do not relate to total pension plans. The series is based on a sample which varies between 85.2% and 
99.18% of total pension funds (95.16% on average in the period).
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Direct interconnections with non-resident financial agents
The	liabilities	of	resident	financial	institutions	vis-à-vis	the	rest	of	the	world	
fell	considerably	after	the	crisis	and	stabilised	as	from	2013.	Chart 2.30 shows 
the assets and liabilities of other monetary financial institutions27 (OMFI) vis-à-vis the 
rest of the world. At present, liabilities vis-à-vis the rest of the world represent 22% 
of the total financial assets of OMFIs, which is 8 pp lower than before the global 
financial crisis. In June 2019, assets vis-à-vis the rest of the world represented 19% 
of total financial assets, their highest value in the series, after the upward trend 
which began in 2013.
The	cross-border	 interconnections	of	banks	and	 investment	 funds	 take	 the	
form	of	holdings	in	marketable	securities	issued	by	non-resident	institutions	
of	 identical	 financial	 sectors.	 Non-residents also own a significant portion of 
marketable securities issued by resident banks. Chart 2.31 shows, using the ECB’s 
27  OMFIs include banks, specialised lending institutions (SLIs), the ICO and money market investment 
funds. This information is from the Financial Accounts of the Spanish Economy which gathers data 
from the the individual balance sheets of institutions in this sector which are resident in Spain. 
Consequently, it does not include exposures through subsidiaries which are not resident in Spain.
OMFI’s liabilities vis-à-vis the rest of the world fell considerably in absolute terms after the crisis and their relative weight in financial assets 
has also decreased by 4.6 pp since June 2011. The level of assets vis-à-vis the rest of the world has remained more stable but its weight in 
total financial assets has increased by 6.2 pp since the same date.
OMFI INTERCONNECTIONS WITH NON-RESIDENT AGENTS
Business in Spain, ID
Chart 2.30
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Includes interbank loans, among others.
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database on the marketable securities holdings28 of different financial sectors in the 
euro area, the total volume of direct interconnections with non-resident financial 
sectors of banks and investment funds resident in Spain in December 2018. The 
main direct cross-border connections are established through the holdings of 
resident banks (€29 billion) and resident investment funds (€70 billion) in instruments 
issued by non-resident institutions. However, certain significant interconnections in 
the opposite direction are observed, such as instruments issued by banks domiciled 
in Spain which are held by non-resident investment funds (€11 billion).
Indirect interconnections
More	than	70%	of	the	marketable	securities	holdings	of	banks	and	insurance	
companies resident in Spain are concentrated in Spanish issuers. Using once 
again the data compiled by the ECB, Chart 2.32 shows the weight that the most 
28  This database excludes data on loans and deposits. Furthermore, it only includes the marketable 
securities	holdings	of	financial	institutions	resident	in	Europe.	Consequently,	the	holdings	of	these	
institutions’ subsidiaries outside Europe are not included either.
The most significant direct cross-border interconnections by volume are due to resident investment funds’ holdings of marketable securities 
issued by non-resident investment funds (€70 billion), followed by resident banks’ holdings of marketable securities issued by non-resident 
banks (€29 billion). Resident investment funds scarcely have cross-border interconnections through their liabilities, whereas the latter are 
significant for resident banks.
DIRECT CROSS-BORDER INTERCONNECTIONS DUE TO HOLDING OF MARKETABLE SECURITIES
December 2018
Chart 2.31
SOURCE: ECB (Securities Holding Statistics by Sector).
a It shows resident institutions' asset holdings of marketable securities issued by non-resident sectors.
b It shows marketable securities issued by resident institutions which are held by non-resident sectors.
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exposed issuers from Spain and other geographical areas represent as a percentage 
of the total holdings of resident financial sectors. The importance of Spanish issuers 
is particularly significant for banks (accounting for more than 80% of their holdings) 
and insurance companies (around 70%). The most geographically diversified sectors 
are investment funds and pension funds.
The	various	 financial	 sectors	 resident	 in	Spain	hold	a	significant	 volume	of	
common	exposures	which	may	be	considered	a	contagion	mechanism.29 As a 
result of these common positions, all the sectors would be affected simultaneously 
by the same shock arising at one securities issuer. More importantly, a potential 
problem in one financial sector could push it into forced selling of assets which are 
also present in one or more other sectors. This could trigger substantial falls in the 
prices of these assets and, therefore, valuation losses for the other holding sectors, 
with the related implications for financial stability.
More	than	45%	of	the	positions	held	in	the	marketable	securities	portfolios	of	
banks,	funds	and	insurance	companies	overlap	with	other	financial	sectors. 
Chart 2.33 shows that the most significant common positions by marketable 
securities volume are those held by the banking sector with other financial sectors 
(approximately €285 billion). However, in order to assess this result properly, it should 
29  The metrics used in this section are similar to those shown in the ECB’s “Financial Stability Report” 
of November 2018 (section 3.2, particularly Chart 3.24 and the related sections).
The relevance of the Spanish issuers in the resident financial sectors portfolios is larger in banks and insurance companies.
MAIN MARKETABLE SECURITIES ISSUERS IN DOMESTIC FINANCIAL SECTORS HOLDINGS
December 2018
Chart 2.32
SOURCE: ECB (Securities Holding Statistics by Sector).
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be considered that banks’ assets mainly comprise loans, which are not included in 
this analysis. The common marketable securities holdings among non-bank 
financial sectors are of a smaller volume, but they are more significant relative to 
each sector’s total securities portfolio. In particular, the proportion of common 
positions in the securities portfolio of pension funds which overlaps with insurance 
companies and investment funds exceeds 75%.
The	 correlation	 of	 the	 holdings	 by	 issuer	 of	 the	 various	 financial	 sectors	
makes	 it	 possible	 to	 estimate	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 there	 is	 a	 similar	
distribution	 of	 securities	 in	 the	 portfolios.	 As at each date, the weights 
represented by the different individual issuers (e.g. a specific sovereign or non-
financial corporation) in each financial sector’s investment portfolio were 
measured. These data were used to calculate the correlation coefficient of these 
weights between each pair of financial sectors (e.g. banks and investment funds). 
An advantage of this measure is that it does not depend on the size of the portfolios 
and, therefore, is not affected by the differences in each sector’s total volume of 
holdings. A positive correlation between the portfolios of two sectors would indicate 
that the holdings whose volume is higher than the average of the total portfolio in 
one of the sectors are also above average in the portfolio of the other sector.
The banking sector has the highest overlap of exposures with other sectors, by volume of exposures. The degree of overlap, in relative terms, 
in the non-banking sector is greater than that in the banking sector but of a lower volume. Similarly, the investment fund and insurance 
company sectors have similar levels of overlap both in terms of volume and as a percentage of their total portfolios.
PORTFOLIO OVERLAP IN MARKETABLE SECURITIES (a)
December 2018
Chart 2.33
SOURCE: ECB (Securities Holding Statistics by Sector).
a The chart shows common holdings of marketable securities, which means ownership of identical securities issued by the same issuer. For example, 
of the common holdings between banks and investment funds, banks hold €284 billion, which represents 47% of their total portfolio; for their part, 
investment funds hold €114 billion, which represent 47% of their total portfolio. The market value of the holdings reported by the entities is considered 
(or, if appropriate, fair value).
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The correlation between financial sectors' portfolios at the level of individual securities has followed a declining trend. At the level of the 
issuer, the correlation is greater and the declining trend is much more contained.
CORRELATION OF PORTFOLIOS OF MARKETABLE SECURITIES
Chart 2.34
SOURCE: ECB (Securities Holding Statistics by Sector).
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This	 correlation	 is	 generally	 very	 high,	 above	 85%,	 in	 all	 the	 sector	 pairs. 
Chart 2.34 shows changes in the correlation between 2014 Q1 and 2018 Q4. There 
are two significant points to be underlined. On one hand, the correlation holds at 
high values and is relatively stable between banks and pension funds and, to a 
certain degree, also between insurance companies and pension funds. On the 
other, correlations of other sectors (e.g. banks and insurance companies, and 
investment funds and pension funds) show a slightly declining trend in recent years.

